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Abstract
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification
results in separation from top down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof
(1970). De and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification prevents unraveling
so that equilibria with full separation do not exist. This note shows that, if one
considers the buyers’ buying decision explicitly, a separating equilibrium with imperfect
certification does exist.
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1 Introduction
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results
in separation from top down due to an unraveling process similar to Akerlof (1970). De
and Nabar (1991) argue that imperfect certification prevents unraveling so that equilibria
with full separation do not exist. The authors, subsequently, conclude in their abstract that
∗Contact details: Roland Strausz, Humboldt–Universita¨t Berlin, strauszr@wiwi.hu-berlin.de; I acknowl-
edge support from the French-German cooperation project ’Market Power in Vertically Related Markets’
funded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
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imperfect certification results in “equilibrium outcomes which are very different from those
implied by models of perfect certification”. This conclusion casts doubts on the robustness of
theoretical work on certification that, for reasons of tractability, assumes perfect certification
technologies (e.g., Biglaiser 1993, Lizerri 1999, Albano and Lizzeri 2001, Strausz 2005, Faure–
Grimaud et al. 2009, Stahl and Strausz 2010). This note shows that, if one considers the
buyers’ buying decision explicitly, a separating equilibrium with imperfect certification does
exist. As a consequence, the results from certification models that are based on perfect
certification are more robust to imperfections in the certification technology than the results
of De and Nabar (1991) suggest.
2 Setup
To demonstrate my argument, I follow exactly the setup of De and Nabar (1991), who
consider a market for a perishable commodity with n potential sellers of one unit of the
commodity. The quality (t) of the product could be either type A or type B.1 Under full
information, type A and type B products would be valued as VA and VB respectively by each
of the set of potential buyers, I, where VA > VB > 0. A fraction π ∈ (0, 1) of all suppliers is
endowed with type A product. Each supplier knows the true quality level of his product. In
an asymmetrically informed market, a supplier’s decision (d), where d ∈ D = {C,U}, could
be either to offer his product for sale uncertified (d = U) or get the quality level of the good
certified (d = C) for an exogenously fixed cost, K < VA − VB, prior to offering it for sale.
2
The certification process results in a rank (r), where r ∈ R = {1, 2}, for the product which
could be either 1 or 2. The certification process is such that a type A product gets a ranking
of 1 with probability qA while a type B product gets a ranking of 1 with probability qB with
1 ≥ qA > qB ≥ 0. Certification is perfect when qA = 1 and qB = 0. The buyers, i ∈ I,
who are all alike, do not observe the true quality level of any product before purchase. They
do, however, know the distribution of types (π) and the characteristics of the certification
1As in De and Nabar (1991), I consider only two types, but results extend to more than two types.
2Clearly, for K > VA − VB certification is too costly to be helpful.
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process (qA, qB). In addition, they observe each supplier’s decision d and, for those suppliers
with d = C, also the certifier’s ranking r.
De and Nabar introduce P (U) as the price of an uncertified good and P (C, r) as the price
of a good that is certified with rank r. They assume that ”all economic agents are risk-neutral
and all markets are competitive” and I follow their idea that, ”in a competitive market, the
price the buyers pay for a product would equal the value they expect from it. In other words,
in such a market, P (C, r) = VAρ(A|C, r)+ VBρ(B|C, r) and P (U) = VAρ(A|U) + VBρ(B|U),
where ρ indicates market posterior beliefs”.
De and Nabar, subsequently, treat supply and demand in a reduced form and, implicitly,
assume that when the price for a product equals the value that buyers expect from it, all
goods on the market are bought. It is here that I extend the analysis and explicitly introduce
α(P, U) as the probability that buyers buy an uncertified good with a price P and α(P,C, r)
as the probability that an uncertified good is sold when the price is P .
Because a supplier with quality t has probability qt of obtaining rank r = 1, the expected
revenue for a supplier of quality t who certifies is
W (t, C, P ) = qtP (C, 1)α(P (C, 1), C, 1)+ (1− qt)P (C, 2)α(P (C, 2), C, 2)−K.
His revenue from selling the good uncertified is W (t, U, P ) = P (U)α(P (U), U). A com-
parison to De and Nabar confirms that the extension incorporates their framework for
α(P (C, 1), C, 1) = α(P (C, 2), C, 2) = α(P (U), U) = 1.
Based on Kreps and Wilson (1982), De and Nabar define a Nash Sequential Equilibrium
(NSE), as an ordered triple (d∗
t
, P ∗, ρ) satisfying the three conditions supplier rationality,
buyer competitiveness, belief consistency. Because I consider the buyers’ buying behavior
explicitly, I need to extend these conditions by buyer rationality. Hence, I define a Nash
Sequential Equilibrium (NSE) as a combination γ∗ = (d∗t , α
∗, P ∗, ρ∗) that satisfies:
(I’) supplier rationality: d∗
t
∈ argmaxd{W (t, d, P )}, d ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ T .
(I”) buyer rationality: α∗(P, U) ∈ argmaxαα[VAρ(A|U)+VBρ(B|U)−P ] and α(P,C, r) ∈
argmaxαα[VAρ(A|C, r) + VBρ(B|C, r)− P ], t ∈ T , r ∈ {0, 1}.
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(II) buyer competitiveness: P ∗(C, r) =
∑
Vtρ(t|C, r), P
∗(U) =
∑
Vtρ(t|U).
(III) belief consistency: If C or U is an equilibrium strategy, the posterior beliefs of each
buyer i, ρ∗(t|C, r) or ρ∗(t|U), are determined by Bayes rule. If C or U is an off-equilibrium
strategy, then ρ∗(t|C, r), ρ∗(t|U) ∈ [0, 1].
3 Results
In this note, I am interested in the existence of a separating equilibrium in which only sellers
with the high quality A certify, i.e., (dA, dB) = (C,U). Viscusi (1978) already noted the
existence of such an equilibrium when certification is perfect but not too costly. With perfect
certification, the sellers’ separation strategies (C,U) together with the belief consistency
requirement (III) pin down the beliefs ρv(A|C, 1) ≡ 1 and ρv(A|U) ≡ 0, but leave the belief
ρv(A|C, 2) undetermined. Hence, ρv(A|C, 2) ≡ 0 is consistent with the belief consistency
requirement. Due to the buyer competitiveness requirement (II), the belief structure ρv(.|.)
implies P v(U) ≡ VB, P
v(C, 1) ≡ VA, and P
v(C, 2) ≡ VB. Given these prices, the separating
strategy (ds
A
, ds
B
) is consistent with supplier rationality requirement (III). Hence, in the
framework of De and Nabar (1991) there exists a separating equilibrium when certification
is perfect. With appropriate choices of α(., .), the separation equilibrium also exists in the
extended framework.
Proposition 1 (Viscusi 1978) With perfect certification (qA, qB) = (1, 0) there exists an
equilibrium that sustains the separating strategy (dA, dB) = (C,U).
Proof: It is straightforward to check that the combination γv ≡ (dv
t
, αv, P v, ρv) with
αv(P, U) ≡ 1 for P ≤ VB and α(P, U) ≡ 0 for P > VB, α(P,C, 1) ≡ 1 for P ≤ VA and
α(P, U) ≡ 0 for P > VA, α(P,C, 2) ≡ 1 for P ≤ VB and α(P, U) ≡ 0 for P > VB satisfies
the conditions (I’), (I”), (II), and (III) and is therefore an NSE. Q.E.D.
De and Nabar (1991) argue that there does not exist a separation equilibrium when
certification is imperfect. I concentrate on the case qA < 1 and qB ∈ [0, qA), where the
argument of De and Nabar is clearest. In this case, the belief consistency condition (III)
4
implies not only that ρ∗(A|C, 1) = 1 and ρ∗(B|U) = 0, but also that ρ∗(A|C, 2) = 1.
Hence, the buyer competitiveness condition (II) implies P ∗(C, 1) = P ∗(C, 2) = VA and
P ∗(U) = VB. Because De and Nabar, effectively, assume α(P (U), U) = α(P (C, 1), C, r) =
α(P (C, 2), C, r) = 1, we have W (A,C, P ) = W (B,C, P ) = VA − K and W (A,U, P ) =
W (B,U, P ) = VB. Due to K < VA − VB, it follows that also the seller of quality qB has a
strict incentive to certify. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 (De and Nabar 1991) For any qA < 1, there does not exist an equilibrium
with α(P (U), U) = α(P (C, 1), C, r) = α(P (C, 2), C, r) = 1 that sustains the separating
strategy (dA, dB) = (C,U).
Proposition 2 suggests that the existence of a separating equilibrium crucially depends
on perfect certification and is not robust to imperfections, however small, in the certification
technology. Yet, because the buyers at the prices P ∗(C, 1), P ∗(C, 2) and P ∗(U) are actually
indifferent, the buying behavior α(P (U), U) = α(P (C, 1), C, r) = 1 and α(P (C, 2), C, r) = 0
is also consistent with buyer rationality (I’). In this case, we have W (A,C, P ) = qaVA −K
and W (B,C, P ) = qBVA −K so that we have a separating equilibrium when qBVA − VB <
K < qAVA−VB. If we define q¯ ≡ (K +VB)/VA so that, due to K < VA−VB, we have q¯ < 1,
we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 For imperfect certification (qA, qB) with qB < q¯ and qA > q¯ there exists an
equilibrium with α(P (U), U) = α(P (C, 1), C, r) = 1 and α(P (C, 2), C, r) = 0 that sustains
the separating strategy (dA, dB) = (C,U).
Proof: From qB < q¯ and qA > q¯ it follows that qBVA − VB < K < qAVA − VB so that
under the buyers’ buying behavior α and prices P ∗(C, 1), P ∗(C, 2) and P ∗(U), the seller
of quality VA has a strict incentive to certify, whereas the seller of quality VB has a strict
incentive not to certify. To complete the proof, the buyers’ rationality condition pins down
the buying behavior α for all remaining prices. In particular, α(P, U) = 1 for P < VB
and α(P, U) = 0 for P > VB, α(P,C, 1) = 1 for P < VA and α(P, U) = 0 for P > VA,
α(P,C, 2) = 1 for P < VA and α(P, U) = 0 for P > VA. Q.E.D.
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4 Conclusion
When buyers and sellers are price takers, a separation equilibrium (C,U) exists when the
imperfection is not too extreme. In particular, an equilibrium exists when the certifica-
tion technology is close to the perfect one (qA, qB) = (1, 0). In this sense, the separation
equilibrium of Proposition 1 is robust to imperfections in the certification technology.
The robustness result does not only hold when buyers and sellers are price takers, but
also when, as in Stahl and Strausz (2010), the privately informed seller sets prices. In this
case, the seller’s price is a signal about his quality and the buyer’s belief will depend on it.
The competitive prices P ∗(C, 1) = P ∗(C, 2) = VA and P
∗(U) = VB of Proposition 2 and 3
can be sustained with the out–off–equilibrium belief that buyers interpret any other price as
an indication that quality is qB.
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